Saturday, March 23, 2024

Antisemitism and Islamophobia are Different: Some Semantic Observations and Questions


Antisemitism and Islamophobia threaten cosmopolitan, multiethnic, multicultural society. I live in one and so do you. Although the antisemite and Islamophobe hate, their hatred has a difference. I have been trying to make sense of the meanings and feelings, individually and culturally evoked, by the words antisemitism and Islamophobia. My informal inquiry calls for an experiment I have not performed, a proper version of Charles Osgood’s semantic differential.  Here is an impression, grounds for my hypothesis, of what I suspect are the “underlying…affective or connotative aspects of language…” that these words bring to mind (Osgood, 1964). 


Something lurks in the difference between anti and phobia: the difference of opposition and fear. Hostility directed at people that deserve harm.  Versus fear, something to sequester or flee. The shared implication is that Jews and Muslims are a problem. But the problems are different. The Jew is despised. Islam is something some are afraid of. 


Implicit in the name of the problems are different solutions, some therapeutic, some militant, some final. A phobia is a mental condition deserving treatment and compassion. Something to cure. A phobia is an over-felt, unrealistic sense of peril. Fear of Islam is a problem to get over. Antisemitism is different: persecution of the Jew justified in ancient blood-libels, enforced by inquisitions, ‘the blood and soil’ of the Holocaust. 


The etymology and modern history of the words are different. Antisemitism was coined in Germany and Austria in the mid nineteenth century.  Islamophobia’s linguistic origins are unclear to me, but was reintroduced in 1976 in The News International, a Pakistani paper. Place matters. Antisemitism as the term of use became relevant in places where restrictive laws and mass murder was sanctioned. In contrast, Islamophobia identifies a mental problem of those outside Islamic society. 


Coupled with anti and phobia is Semite and Islam. Semite = Jew as the despised other, a race apart. The Jewish is in the blood. Islam as an optional creed and culture; merely but profoundly the religion of those called Muslims. 


The Washington Post on 12/9/23, ran a headline with a story that caught my attention. The headline read "What the federal probe into antisemitism, Islamophobia at schools is about". Beneath the headline the content shifts to "The probe is a part of the Biden administration’s effort to crack down on the “alarming nationwide rise in reports of antisemitism, anti-Muslim, anti-Arab, and other forms of discrimination and harassment” on school campuses across the country…". The federal department’s language, vetted and deliberate in attempts at a level playing field, employs anti across terms; but the Post’s headline, the attention grabber, uses anti and phobia. It is this less considered expression, the ordinary language of the headline, that shouts semantic differential and points to the feeling. 


Here’s Osgood’s 1964 introduction to the Semantic Differential:

“MOST comparisons across cultures are extremely difficult when they concern nonmaterial traits. In part, this is an obvious consequence of the subjective nature of comparisons; in part also, however, this difficulty is attributable to the fact that nonmaterial traits must often be assessed through the medium of language. Indeed, if the Sapir-Whorf psycholinguistic relativity hypothesis were taken literally and considered completely general to all aspects of human cognition, such comparisons would be impossible. The essential point is this: to note differences within any phenomenal domain and order them in any rigorous fashion, one must have certain similarities underlying the phenomena as a frame of reference against which to compare them. Only to the extent that physical objects share such attributes as length, weight, and volume, and to the extent that these attributes can be abstracted and quantified, can comparison be made on anything other than an intuitive basis. 

The denotative or referential uses of terms-the way the lexicon carves up the world appear largely arbitrary and unique to particular languages until the ethnolinguist discovers a framework of semantic components that can be imposed comparably on these phenomena, in closely analogous fashion, our own research over the past few years provide evidence for a universal frame- work underlying certain affective or connotative aspects of language. These findings enliven the possibility of constructing instruments for measuring these aspects of "subjective culture" comparably in diverse societies in effect, circumventing the language barrier.' Since the affective reactions people make to symbols and events are important determiners of their overt behaviors with respect to these symbols and events, having comparable means of measuring affective meanings assumes some importance in a world that is rapidly shrinking psychologically, socially, and politically.”   Osgood, C. E. (1964). Semantic Differential Technique in the Comparative Study of Cultures. American Anthropologist, 66(3), 171–200.





Tuesday, March 5, 2024

Wittgenstein and Chomsky's Different Subject Matters: Some lessons from Descriptive Psychology

In 1973 in early meetings with Peter Ossorio, I asked what might assist my understanding Descriptive Psychology’s Person Concept. He suggested Wittgenstein. During Wittgenstein’s life, he published one book, the 1921 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, dying before the 1953 publication of his second, the Philosophical Investigations. The Tractatus starts with “The world is all that is the case” and asserts “The world is the totality of facts, not of things.” A prime mission of the Investigations was amending and expanding this concept of World to include the themes that Wittgenstein previously thought required philosophical silence. I read, and Pete and I discussed what we thought was at stake for Wittgenstein as he assembled a methodology of reminders and maxims in the service of describing the fully connected but irregular terrain of language and world; that “there is not a single philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, different therapies, as it were.” 

 

The year before I met Ossorio, I struggled with Noam Chomsky’s 1966 Cartesian Linguistics. I had difficulty with the implications of his “universal transformational grammar”.  That was some time ago. A few weeks back, strolling through the wonderful Stand Bookstore in NYC, I picked up Chomsky’s 2015, What Kind of Creatures Are We? Starting with the first chapter “What is Language” I experienced clarity I didn’t possess before my immersion in the lessons Ossorio taught.

 

A foundational lesson of the pre-empirical Person Concept is that it is not an empirically vindicated theory: it is not a theory at all.  Instead, The Person Concept identifies the interdependent concepts of an Individual who can engage in Deliberate Action in a Dramaturgical fashion that is fully expressible in Verbal Behavior that reflects the Social Practices of the Individual's Culture and Communities as the Person goes about their life in a World of worlds. That’s not a theory, it’s a conceptualization that we have the option to agree to use or not. Arguably, the interdependence of person, action, language, community, culture, and world reflects the state of affairs of a Paradigmatic Person.

 

On the other hand, Chomsky’s “biolinguistics framework” is both a pre-empirical formulation of language and an embodiment theory regarding the potential for linguistic competence. As theory it is subject to empirical challenge and vindication.  

 

Here a key technical distinction is the idea that 1) conceptualizations identify and formulate a subject matter; 2) the empirical identifies instances/instantiations of the subject matter in a real historical world, and 3) the job of theory is to sort out why, given the full range of a subject matter’s possibilities, only particular patterns of instances are found.


Below is an abstract of the three subject matters: 1) Ossorio's pre-empirical conceptualization of Verbal Behavior: 2) Wittgenstein's Language Games as Forms of Life; and 3) Chomsky's theory of a universal substrate that provides grammar.


1)  Ossorio’s subject matter is the Concept of Verbal Behavior.

He identifies the parameters of Verbal Behavior in his pre-empirical Formula as a set of grammar linked Concepts, expressed in symbolic Locutions; that signify specific Behaviors and Social Practices. 


2)  Wittgenstein’s Equivalences and Interconnections 

96. Other illusions come from various quarters…Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture, of the world. These concepts:  proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each. (But what are these words to be used for now? The language-game in which they are to be applied is missing).


Wittgenstein’s Language Games are family resemblance groups akin to his ‘Forms of Life’:  anthropological, social, intellectual, and aesthetic social practices. Forms of Life are akin to Ossorio's Behavior as Social Practices.


3)  Chomsky’s Theory concerns 'I'(nternal) and 'E'(piphenomenal) Language. 'I' Language is the specific, universal bio-linguistic substrate, mostly provided by the human brain; a basic property of thought, a “deep structure” universal within humans that provides a generative transformational potential for the full range of grammar necessary for linguistic competence. 'E' language is external communication. Chomsky appears less interested in communication and social practice.

Wittgenstein's focus is on the grammar that links concepts that correspond to utterances that reflect the range of distinctions that inform action. Chomsky has an embodiment theory, a theory of a brain's provision for grammar that allows an infinite array of possible expressions.  

Ossorio's Verbal Behavior Formula presents these differences as involving different parameters. 

If you’re interested, here’s the presentation at the 45th Annual Conference of the Society for Descriptive Psychology:


Wittgenstein and Chomsky's Different Subject Matters: Some lessons from Descriptive Psychology.