Saturday, May 28, 2016

Through-Lines and Dogs. Significance in Dog Psychology.

You can trust a dog with your life...but not your lunch.  Stephen Huneck

Maxim 1. A person takes it that things are as they seem unless they have reason enough to think otherwise.  Peter Ossorio

A through-line description is, paradigmatically, the description of a non-contiguous sequence of a person's courses of action as having a shared significance.  For me, that's sufficient formulation.  Greg Colvin 


A friend asked what through-line descriptions I could give of my dogs. Dogs are impulsive. Maybe not the highly trained, but the dogs I know are.  A student of mine remarked that dogs are like children with impulse control issues.  She went on to suggest cats "are sort of on the spectrum".  Certainly my dogs could do a better job at restraint and the cats I love seem a bit indifferent.  

What follows are thoughts about dogs and their personable ways.  I'll use the Descriptive Psychological Person Concept, the interdependent concepts of Individual Person, Behavior, Language, and World. I'm going to make a point of invoking person qualities where they seem appropriate.  I'm aware of the hazards of being overly anthropomorphic.  We might argue about this.

I think no one in their right mind doubts dogs have personalities, with individually different abilities and dispositions. If you know a dog, you recognize a character. While never knowing exactly what a dog will do, we come to know what they find important. They sometimes surprise us, but mostly they act in-character in their dogged ways. 

I am certain dogs are intentional actors, consciously aware and often deliberate.  If you seriously doubt this, my bet is that you relate to them differently than I do. (And that's too bad. Here, I'm thinking “I to Dog” akin to “I to Thou”, in contrast to “I to It”.  My dogs are family members, not property.  This is a topic for a different time.)

That dogs have personal characteristics and engage in intentional action, paradigmatic intentional action, carries the logical requirement that their behavior involves courses of action with significance. Their lives have through-lines organized by what they hold important.  I think this is the case for all animals. The through-lines descriptive of humans may seem more complex but that claim may be an artifact of a failure to recognize the nuanced sensitivities and forms of life that matter to our canine companions. Obviously they hear and smell beyond my competence to judge what they appreciate. These sensitivities inform their natural needs and provide significant information beyond my ken. Why do they roll in dead worms with such obvious delight? 

All personal characteristics develop from an individual's prior capacities (e.g., in-born and developed sensitivities and body based needs) and their intervening experiences. Dogs and humans alike find themselves in an environment of restricted possibilities where they find, create, and practice their individual ways. Dogs are usually more restricted than humans. We keep them this way.

It's appropriate to think of a dog as a sort of person. For this to make sense I need to explain how I'm using the concept. By person I mean an individual whose history is, paradigmatically, a history of Deliberate Action in a Dramaturgical Pattern, a pattern that makes sense the way stories do. A person's actions follow from their individual characteristics and their circumstances, reflecting what they try to achieve given their values.  Having values means being able to want some state of affairs over others. This in turn produces the patterns I call through-lines, a form of description that identifies an individual's significant concerns.  Along with the ability to engage in deliberate acts, paradigmatic persons also have language, an ability to deliberately share symbolic representations corresponding to their world, states, and practices. 

Deliberate Action is a form of behavior in which a person (a) engages in an intentional or goal directed action, (b) is Cognizant of that, and (c) has chosen to do that.  A person is not always engaged in a deliberate action but has the ability to do so.  A human being is an individual who is both a person and a specimen of Homo sapiens. This last sentence carries the reminder that non-human individuals could also be persons. By paradigmatic I am referring to the method of paradigm case formulation that allows for variations and transformations in the paradigm, including the deletion of elements.  Paradigmatic refers to a full or undoubted case, a case where all competent judges likely agree. Some judges may find some attributes more essential than others, but by starting with a paradigm where we agree, it's simple when elements are transformed or deleted, to know where we disagree. Dogs, to me, are deficit case persons. 

Intentional action involves something an individual recognizes and wants, and knows how to achieve. This corresponds to a performance, an observable implementation of trying to achieve what desired. Intentional action has significance, ultimately grounded in the actor’s intrinsic, done-for-it's-own-sake values. The reasons for an intentional action are ultimately or finally justified by something intrinsic.  (In a baseball game, the pitcher by throwing a pitch, is trying to strike out the batter, by trying to strike out the batter, he is trying to win the game, by trying to win the game, he is doing what baseball players do if they are actually playing baseball.) Keep this in mind, because a problem in understanding the behavior of dogs is we can't simply ask, "what are you trying to do by doing that?".  Nor can we ask, "what didn't you do?"  This last question makes it difficult to judge if the behavior was chosen, i.e., deliberate.  This doesn't mean it wasn't deliberate, it just means it's hard to gather the evidence that comes with a verbal description of choice.  Choices are easiest to see when the speaker can tell us what option wasn't selected. We will return to this since some reasons for behavior, especially those that involve ethical or aesthetic values, require the ability to engage in deliberate action, the ability to decide not to go down a particular path.  Choice can involve renunciation, "the high road or the low road?" 

Significance, as I am employing it in it's Descriptive Psychological sense, is grounded by something intrinsic. Humans, paradigmatic Persons, are able to successfully justify an act as significant given their intrinsic and specific Hedonic, Prudent, Ethical/Moral and Aesthetic concerns.  I'll return to this in a bit.  I have no trouble arguing dogs have hedonic and prudent concerns.  Clearly they're pleasure seeking, pain avoiding, and self-interested. I don't doubt they are cognizant and deliberate, but I'd have trouble making a strong case that dogs have ethical and aesthetic values, even though I think some might.  I treat my dogs as deficit case persons, worthy of respect, but they're dogs so I don't trust them with my lunch (but then again, I might not trust you either). 

Do dogs have an ethical sense?  A 2008 study in The Proceeding of the American Academy of Sciences found that dogs respond to unfair treatment, cooperating less when they witness a partner dog getting a bigger share of food. Since I don't know of a case where a dog has acted to make sure another dog gets a fair share, this seems more a matter of self-interest than an ethical concern with fair distribution. Perhaps they only really care when they are at the short end of the stick. But I can't speak for what the dog is actually considering. 

Dogs are clearly less competent than humans in language use, although I don’t write them off completely. (Another point to argue). Their limited verbal repertory along with the importance they give hedonics and prudence, with an apparent lack of ethical and aesthetic perspective, keeps them deficit cases in my book. But here are all sorts of reasons to argue.  I argue with myself about this.

Some Limitations to a Dog's Through-Lines 

Dependency, rapid maturation, and an extraordinary awareness of smell and sound, inform and shape a dog's all too short life.  In the span of human growth from infancy to adolescence, most dogs live their entire lives. By the time a human has just begun to understand what they find significant, a dog has come and gone. This makes for shorter through-lines.  As a human with a limited ability to appreciate the nuanced world my dog senses, the through-line descriptions I offer are less complex and differentiated than those I construct for a human I know well. My limited appreciation limits my competence to adequately describe what they find significant. This, I suspect, is also partly why dogs are sometimes described in ways we talk about children.  A dog's life and a human's youth span a similar number of days. And dogs, like human children, are domesticated, bred and socially shaped to fit the worlds of persons and our ways. 

Since children and domestic animals are dependent on the support of a more mature human community, their through-lines, informed by their idiosyncratic discoveries, largely concern their standings with each other and with their keepers and providers.  We watch them sort out whether to lead or follow, whether they've been individually recognized, and whether they're in good standing.  This and food seem front and center. Maybe more for dogs. By food I include the crap they constantly try to snap up and swallow.

The through-lines I can construct for my dogs are descriptions of how they manage their dependency and the imposed restrictions on their lives.  Since through-lines are an observer's construct, the descriptions I develop center on how I see them interact with me, each other, our family, neighbors, and the other dogs, strangers, and other animals encountered on walks.  

The trick with describing their through-lines is finding a nuance that captures the pattern.  So here's some for the dogs I live with. 

Hart, a dachshund rat terrier mix:  

Tirelessly keeping his eye on the "ball", he seeks potential allies incessantly imploring them to play his game so he can show off his varied moves and respond to acknowledgment. 

Sweetly obstinate, heedless of the other's power and direction, he makes a show of a resistance to follow. Knowing he will eventually come along, he digs in his heels and delays any attempt that distract him from a mission to sniff and mark where he's been. 

Here's two for Banjo, a dachshund lab: 

"Following from ahead of the pack", insistently eager to connect and please, he seeks acknowledgment and a secure place where he'll not be bothered. 

Disregarding the consequences, if it smells palatable, it's to be gobbled. (Actually, this describes both Banjo and Hart). 

Not paradigmatically competent with language, but very communicative, both dogs mix and string sounds, phatic and evocative, along with body gestures that convey meaning. My understanding of their intended meanings, varied and sometimes complex, is vindicated by their response. If I respond with what they want, they stop imploring. The signal to noise ratio seems largely signal. If there is grammar to what they convey, it is simple and conforms to the forms of life, the practices, that matter to them. It seems to me that if I keep my vocalizations short and relevant to their concerns, they mostly respond accordingly, unless they don't want to. But that's the case with everyone I deal with. 

It is when I play with Banjo and Hart that I find reason to think they have a limited ethical and aesthetic perspective. Hart, at some point nightly, will stand in front of me, catch my eye, and bark. Then he'll stare. Banjo will run in from the bedroom, check out the scene, and for reasons hard to fathom, remain or return to the bedroom where he rearranged the pillows and snuck some item of my wife's clothing, never mine. I usually try to ignore Hart because I have my own agenda. But if he can hold my eye, he'll bark again, make a puppy whine and then turn his head to the mantle where his toys are almost hidden. He'll try to catch my eye and when he does he points to the balls.  He moves his eyes from mine to the mantle and eagerly waits.  I know he wants to play.

If he's caught me in the right mood, I take one of the squishy balls and toss it. Grounders, popups, fakes to the right or left. Gleeful mid-air catches and in-air toss backs. This goes on and on and on and on. When Hart makes a particularly artful catch he wiggles the way he does when excited and praised. He catches better than he throws, I'm lazy, so if he hasn't tossed the ball right to me I'll say something that amounts to "not close enough".  He'll look at me again and if he wants to continue will nudge the ball closer.  Sometimes he doesn't want to give it back, especially if Banjo intrudes. Banjo, awkward with the game, mostly runs interference. If he can, instead of bringing it back to me, he'll steal it and return to the bedroom inviting chase.  

This is a game. It has shared rules of fair and foul, and the happy appreciation of the beauty of a well executed play. Seeing it this way, acting accordingly, makes it work. 


but if dogs could talk....











Here's links to "What is a Person? And how can we be sure?" , where I examine the question of non-human persons,  and  "The Person Concept",  the foundation of behavioral science.
And on the Descriptive concept of "through-lines".

And what you already know that your dog knows, your dog understands the meaning and significance of your relevant language.

4 comments:

  1. CJ Stone here. I can't tell how your blog is seeing me and if my name will appear.

    PART 1
    Pretty good DP and descriptions.

    "The dogs are family." Human status assignment. Dogs have a society that doesn't include family statuses. Xtine's dogs didn't know what to make of me at first. When one of them tried to dominate me, I cut that off. Now I'm offered a belly to rub, so I have a status of greater rank than theirs but below Xtine.

    "I think no one in their right mind doubts dogs have personalities." We can be more specific and describe them in terms of the Dispositions. You have done a little bit of this in your profiles of them.

    "... we come to know what they find significant..." Careful—I think you mean "important" here; that is, what they value (their rank of wants). On that topic, it might be interesting to see if your dogs would choose you over your lunch, but we'd have to find a way to convince them you were genuinely under attack while a sandwich was being offered them. Not impossible, but not easy, neithers.

    "I am certain dogs are intentional actors, aware and deliberate." Again, careful—Deliberate Action is a special case of Intentional Action. I agree they are intentional; I think they are sometimes deliberate; but this points at my hypothesis that persons are very densely deliberate by comparison, densely enough to make the Dramaturgical Pattern. If the dogs don't have a dramaturgical pattern, or if it is a weak one, we have a way to look at them. (For more on this, read the DPP edition of *Personality and Personality Theories*, where Pete has not yet committed to Deliberate Action as the distinction that marks a Person...and muses about it.)

    On "aware", that's not a term we use in DP, so we must proceed carefully. They dogs are conscious of and conscious as, otherwise they couldn't assign you the alpha role and themselves subordinate but ranked roles; they couldn't act from those roles. But they can; therefore, etc.

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    Replies
    1. Yes, thanks. When I say dogs are family, I mean to me and mine. I've edited the posting to reflect your other comments. They seem correct to me.

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  2. PART 2

    It's important for you not to conflate significance and importance. What the dogs find important is a comment on their values, a comment on what's in the Want parameter. It is not a comment on the content of the Significance parameter. The significance of catching your eye and looking away is "engaging you in play". That's what he's doing by doing that. We can deduce that play is important by the frequency with which this "engaging" behavior takes place. But even if he only "engaged" once per year, that would still be the significance of the relatively unimportant behavior.

    (I see that "important" is a concept we need to bring out in the DP structure of concepts, parallel to the Values concept.)

    "Having values means being able to want some state of affairs over others. " This is subtly awry. First, the ability to want one SoA over another is different than the ability to *achieve* one SoA over another. I can have many wants and completely lack the ability to achieve them. Example: someone in a supermax prison. Values is an Observer category. After you have achieved your wants, those achievements are *ranked*, and the results are your values—the observable rank of wants. From that, I might set expectations for your achievements because I understand the order in which you express your wants. (You essentially correctly state this a couple paragraphs later.)

    "Intentional action has significance, grounded in the actor’s intrinsic, done-for-it's own-sake values." Significance is not by the very fact intrinsic. Intrinsic significances are candidates for stopping further descriptions and saying, "This is what P is doing." But there can be further intrinsic significances that are also *simultaneously* candidates for what P is doing; and P can be doing all of them at once. Similarly, P can have orthogonal intrinsic significances that are also candidates for what P is doing. So P can be doing many things at once, and the many things don't have to be related in any other way than that P did them. Example: P marries Q, princess of Petelvania. By doing so, he 1) marries the woman he loves; 2) bests R, his rival for Q's hand; 3) fulfills his father's command to marry within a year or lose his inheritance; 4) wins "The Bachelor: Petelvania" TV show; 5) becomes prince of Petelvania. I think you state it correctly a couple sentences later, but you are at odds with yourself with both sentences in the same paragraph.

    When dogs are doing the sharing, they don't use the concept "fair". The top dog gets the most, and lower dogs get less until there is none. Certainly no dog likes that, and that's why they fight for the top (or higher) positions. But we will never see dogs as we have them sharing out with equity; and I think that's in reality, a boundary condition on their behaviors, because they cannot choose any other social structure. From this view, if the dog gets less it *ought* to be less cooperative, as that is a way of fighting the top dog (the human who's passing out the food).

    That's all I've got time for tonight.

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